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We study the properties associated to various denitions of ambiguity ([8], [9], [18] and
[23]) in the context of Maximin Expected Utility (MEU). We show that each denition
of unambiguous events produces certain restrictions on the set of priors, and completely
characterize each denition in terms of the properties it imposes on the MEU functional.
We apply our results to two open problems. First, in the context of MEU, we show
the existence of a fundamental incompatibility between the axiom of Small unambigu-
ous event continuity" ([8]) and the notions of unambiguous event due to Zhang [23] and
Epstein-Zhang [8]. Second, we show that, in the context of MEU, the classes of unam-
biguous events according to either Zhang [23] or Epstein-Zhang [8] are always -systems.
Finally, we reconsider the various denitions in light of our ndings, and identify some
new objects (Z-lters and EZ-lters) corresponding to properties which, while neglected
in the current literature, seem relevant to us.
Key Words: ambiguous events, maxmin expected utility.
JEL classication number: D81
1. INTRODUCTION
The idea of Ambiguity has been central to the research in decision theory for
several decades. The story is well-known. On one hand, Savages theory [21] pos-
tulates that a decision maker be able to assign probabilities to all events. On the
other hand, it is hard to dismiss the intuition that in many situations the infor-
mation available to the decision maker might be insu¢ cient for doing so. Roughly
speaking, Ambiguity" refers to these situations, and the classic experiments by
Ellsberg [7] have convincingly demonstrated its empirical relevance.
The conict featuring Savages theory on one side and the idea of Ambiguity on
the other, has generated spectacular theoretical developments: Choquet Expected
Utility [22], Maxmin Expected Utility (henceforth, MEU) [11] and several general-
izations of the latter ([9], [14], [17]). All these models allow for modes of behavior
that are not necessarily consistent with Savages Subjective Expected Utility the-
ory. In particular, they can accommodate behavior of the type observed by Ellsberg.
Yet, in most of this work, the idea of Ambiguity has remained in the background:
more an inspirational muse rather than a central, fully spelled out concept.
1We are grateful to Massimo Marinacci and Klaus Nehring for useful discussions.
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The formalization of the concept of Ambiguity is a more recent matter, mostly
of the past decade. Since the idea refers to situations where not all events are
assigned probabilities, the goal has been that of characterizing such events. These
are called ambiguous, and all the others are termed unambiguous. As of today,
several denitions have been proposed, amended, criticized and the literature, in
spite of its recent start, is already quite sizeable. We refer the reader to [8] and [9]
for some of the history of the problem.
This wealth of denitions as well as the richness of the debate sorrounding
them (see, for instance, [8], [9], [10], [13], [15], [18], [19], [20], [23]) motivate the
present work. Our goal is to contribute to the debate by providing a new way of
looking at the problem. We do so by studying the properties associated to various
denitions of ambiguity within the context of a familiar model like MEU. The
novelty of our approach consists in the realization that the demand that a certain
event be unambiguous is equivalent to the demand that the MEU functional 
and, hence, the set of priors display certain properties. As di¤erent denition of
ambiguous events" lead to di¤erent properties, one achieves a better understanding
of those very denitions. All the more, the focus of the debate can shift toward the
desiderabilty of these properties.
Our results admit a dual reading. Let x be a certain denition of Ambiguous
events, and let T be an event. Our results say that T is x-unambiguous if and
only if the MEU functional displays a certain property. Alternatively, one can
view our results as follows. For x a denition of Ambiguous events, let fAig be a
certain collection of events that are termed at the outset as x-unambiguous. Then,
our study shows (a) whether or not there exists a MEU model compatible with
this situation; and, in the a¢ rmative case, that (b) the set of priors dening the
MEU functional must have a certain form. The latter case can be axiomatized by
introducing an additional axiom in the familiar MEU setting. We notice this only
occasionally.
In the nal sections, we apply our results to study two open problems in the
literature on ambiguous events. The rst regards the axiom of Small unambiguous
event continuity" introduced in [8]. The desiderability of the axiom, which is cru-
cial for the derivation of a unique probability measure on the classes of Zhang and
Epstein-Zhang unambiguous events, has recently been questioned (see, in particu-
lar, [15] and [20]). In the context of MEU, our main result states the existence of a
fundamental incompatibility between this axiom and the notions of unambiguous
events due to Zhang and Epstein-Zhang (Section 6). The second problem regards
the properties of the classes of unambiguous events according to [8] and [23], respec-
tively. Both classes were originally claimed to be -systems. Later, Kopylov [15]
showed that, in general, they are only mosaics (a notion he introduced). Yet, the
problem of what conditions guarantee that those classes are, in addition, -systems
has been left open. Here, we show that, in the context of MEU, those classes are
indeed -systems.
Finally, we reconsider the various denitions of ambiguity in light of our ndings,
and identify some new objects (Z-lters and EZ-lters) corresponding to properties
which, while neglected in the current literature, seem relevant to us.
2. SETTING
Our goal is to achieve a deeper understanding of the meaning of various den-
itions of ambiguous events proposed in the literature. To study the properties of
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unambiguous events in the context of a well-understood model like MEU seems to
us one but an obvious step in this direction. Ultimately, di¤erences across various
denitions are better appreciated in terms of di¤erent properties they generate.
In pursuing our goal, however, we need to avoid spurios di¤erences which might
emerge solely as a consequence of the model we are using. Put, in a di¤erent way,
we should guarantee that (still within MEU) the setting we choose is as neutral"
as possible with respect to the various denitions. The crux of the matter, here,
is that both Zhang [23] and Epstein-Zhang [8] impose, in their work, axioms lead-
ing to the existence of a countably additive, nonatomic probability measure on the
class of unambiguous events. For other denitions, like Nehrings or Ghirardato-
Maccheroni-Marinaccis, this is possibile in the context of MEU only if all the
priors are both countably additive and nonatomic and only if the class of unam-
biguous events is su¢ ciently rich.
To guarantee that these properties can be satised, we need to impose three
more axioms on the original Gilboa-Schmeidlers MEU axiomatization. Two of
these have been recently identied by Chateauneuf-Maccheroni-Marinacci-Tallon
[5] and ensure that all the priors in the representation are both countably additive
and nonatomic. They also ensure that there exists a prior with respect to which
all the others are absolutely continuous. We refer the reader to [5] (in particular,
Lemma 3) for the full specication of the model and the proof of these facts.
The third axiom, which delivers the richness of the class of unambiguous events
either in the sense of Nehring or Ghirardato-Maccheroni-Marinacci, requires a bit of
notation. Let C be the set of priors in the representation. As noticed ([5], Lemma 3),
there exists a prior in C, say , such that all other priors are absolutely continuous
with respect to . Hence, for each prior there exists a density (with respect to )
and the set C is isometrically isomorphic to a set of densities D  L1(S;; ).
Let D? =  2 L1(S;; ) j R gd = 0 for all g 2 D	, and let D?(A) be the
set of all s vanishing a.e. on the complement of the measurable set A.
Definition 1 (Kingman and Robertson [12]). D is said to be thin if and only
if D?(A) is di¤erent from the zero subspace whenever (A) > 0.
We say that a set of priors C is thin if the corresponding set of densities is, and
we restrict to preferences for which the set of priors is always thin. In the con-
text of Chateauneuf-Maccheroni-Marinacci-Tallons axiomatization, it was shown
in [2] (Proposition 10) that there exists a countably additive, nonatomic probability
measure on the class of Ghirardato-Maccheroni-Marinacci (equivalently, Nehrings)
unambiguous events if and only if the assumption is satised.
We conclude this section by stating the notation that we use throughout the
paper. S denotes the state space,  is a  algebra of events in S and Y is the
prize space, which we assume is a mixture space ([11] and [5]). The set of acts
is F = ff : S ! Y j f is simple and  measurableg, with the generic elements
f; g; h; :::etc. The decision maker has a preference relation, <, on F , which is






where C is a convex and weak*-compact set of nitely additive probability mea-
sures on (S;), and u : Y ! R is a linear utility on the prize space. As noted,
the axioms introduced in [5] guarantee that these probabilities are, in addition,
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countably additive and nonatomic. The utility function u produces an embedding
of the acts into the set B0() of bounded real-valued simple functions on S, and the
functional I (and, hence, the preference relation) is extended to the whole B0() in
the obvious way ([11]). Because of this, from now on we drop any reference to the
utility function (that is, from now on an act f if viewed as a real-valued function).
3. DEFINITIONS OF AMBIGUOUS EVENTS
We distinguish between two groups of denitions of ambiguous events. One
group features the denitions given by Nehring [18] and Ghirardato, Maccheroni
and Marinacci [9], the other those given by Zhang [23] and Epstein and Zhang [8].
This classication is motivated solely by the structure displayed by the denitions,
and not by other considerations.
In the context of Multiple Prior models, the denitions of ambiguous events
given by Nehring and Ghirardato, Maccheroni and Marinacci are known to be
equivalent, and correspond to the following
Definition 2. An event T 2  is unambiguous if 8P;Q 2 C, P (T ) = Q(T ).
Otherwise it is ambiguous.
Since we are going to be dealing with di¤erent notions of ambiguous events, we
need a name to distinguish these unambiguous events from the others we will meet
later. We borrow from Dubins and Margolis [6],2 and we call naturally measurable
all the events that are unambiguous in the sense of Denition 2. The class of
naturally measurable events is denoted by ANM .
It is a straigtforward consequence of the denition that the class ANM is closed
under the operation of taking complements, and that it is, in fact, a -system
([9]). Under the thinness assumption of the previous section, it contains events of
measure , for any  2 [0; 1] (see [2]; this measure is univoquely dened because of
the very nature of naturally measurable events).
Naturally measurable events admit the following behavioral characterization,
which is proven in [9]. If f is a function on S and w is a real number (recall that
acts have been identied to real-valued functions), we denoted by fTw the real-
valued function on S which coincides with f on T and is identically equal to w on
T c (the complement of T ).
Proposition 1 ([9]). T is naturally measurable if and only if for any f; g 2 F ,
w;w0 2 R and for any  2 (0; 1)
f  g =) f + (1  )(wTw0)  g + (1  )(wTw0)
The next two denitions are stated directly in behavioral terms. The denition
proposed by Zhang [23] reads as follows
Definition 3. An event T 2  is unambiguous if 8f; g 2 F , w 2 R
fTw < gTw =) fTw0 < gTw0 for any w0 2 R (2)
and the same implication holds for T c. Otherwise T is ambiguous.
2While introduced in a di¤erent context, the terminology seems especially suited to us (see
[6]).
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The denition given in Epstein-Zhang [8] displays a similar structure but it is
weaker in that limits the comparison (2) only to a certain subset of F  F . For
T 2 , let A and B be two disjoint subsets of T . Consider an act f of the form
f =
8>>>><>>>>:
y if s 2 A
y if s 2 B
z(s) if s 2 S(A [B)
where y and y are real numbers and z(s) = f jS(A[B). An EZ-conjugate of f is
an act f dened by
f =
8>>>><>>>>:
y if s 2 A
y if s 2 B
z(s) if s 2 S(A [B)
that is, f is obtained from f by exchanging the prizes on A and B. The denition
given in Epstein and Zhang reads as follows
Definition 4. An event T 2  is unambiguous if 8f 2 F , w 2 R and for any
conjugate f of f
fTw < fTw =) fTw0 < fTw0 for any w0 2 R
and the same implication holds for T c. Otherwise T is ambiguous.
The restriction to comparisons involving only conjugate acts is motivated by
the intuition that an event T should be termed unambiguous if (and only if) the
relative conditional likelyhood of any two of its subevents, A and B, is invariant
with respect to changes in the prize on T c (see [8]).
The classes of unambiguous events according to Zhang and Epstein-Zhang are
denoted byAZ andAEZ , respectively. These two notions of ambiguity have recently
found a very elegant treatment in the work of Kopylov [15]. There, among other
things, Kopylov shows that the two classes are mosaics and noticed that they are
not necessarily -systems.
At any rate, in the setting we study, there is an obvious relation among the
three notions, which we state in the next proposition.3
Proposition 2. ANM  AZ  AEZ .
As these inclusions come straight from the denitions, we do not provide a
proof (however, many of the results we present later implicitly contain a proof of
this fact).
It is well-known that, in the setting we consider, the inclusion ANM  AZ may
be strict. The following example is due to Nehring [20].
Example 1 (Nehring [20]). Fix an event T 2 . Let 1 and 2 denote two
weak*-closed and convex sets of nitely additive probability measures supported by
3Obviously, the inclusion AZ  AEZ is true in general.
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T and T c, respectively. Fix ;  such that 0 <  <  < 1: Dene the weak*-closed
and convex set  as follows:
  [; ]1+[1 ; 1 ]2  f1+(1 )2 j     , 1 2 1; 2 2 2g
and let the preference < be the one induced by  according to the MEU functional
(1).
The reader can readily check that T is Z-unambiguous, and hence EZ-unambiguous,
but not naturally measurable because  6= .4
Nehrings example goes a long way beyond showing that the inclusion ANM 
AZ is strict. In fact, as we shall see (Theorem 4), it provides remarkable insights
into the structure of the events which are unambiguous either according to Zhang
or to Epstein and Zhang.
We study naturally measurable events in the next section, and Zhang and
Epstein-Zhang unambiguous events in Section 5. The unifying theme is the re-
alization that  for x a certain denition of unambiguous event  an event is x-
unambiguous if and only if the set of priors (and hence the maxmin functional)
displays a certain structure. These ndings will clarify both the di¤erences and
the similarities existing across the various denitions we consider. In Section 6, we
apply our results to address two issues. Namely, whether or not the classes AZ and
AEZ are -systems and to which extent Zhangs and Epstein-Zhangs denitions
are compatible with the axiom of small unambiguous event continuity" ([8], Axiom
4). Section 7 contains some concluding remarks. Proofs are in Appendix. Section
A.* in Appendix refers to material contained in Section * in the main text.
4. NATURALLY MEASURABLE EVENTS
The main result of this section (Theorem 1) states the existence of a certain
relation between naturally measurable events and the structure of the set C, which
denes the MEU functional. Precisely, if  = fig is a (nite) partition of S into
naturally measurable events, then C can be written as a unique convex combination
of a collection of sets fCigi2 , C =
P
iCi , and each measure in Ci is supported
by i. Equivalently, given a partition into naturally measurable events, the set
C can be decomposed into a (canonical) system of sets of conditional measures.
Later in this section and more thoroughly in Section 7, we will elaborate on the
interpretation attached to this type of decompositions. Notice, that in the special
case  = fT; T cg, our result says that to each naturally measurable event there is
associated a certain decomposition of the set of priors and, hence, a special form of
the MEU functional I.
Let  = fig be a nite partition of S with the property that each i 2 ANM
(existence of such partitions is guaranteed by the thinness assumption of Section 2;
see [2]).
Theorem 1. There exist (a) a unique collection of non-empty, weak? compact,
and convex sets of priors fCigi2 , where for any i 2 ; Ci  fP j P is a
probability measure on ig; and (b) a unique probability distribution q on S= (the
4 In his original example [20], Nehring restricts to a prize space having two outcomes only. The
reader can readily check that his reasoning extends without modications to any number of prizes.
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We stress that the decomposition of Theorem 1 holds for any act f 2 F . With
this in mind, Theorem 1 lends itself to an interesting interpretation. We can think
of MEU decision maker as of someone who follows a two-step procedure. In the rst
step, acts are decomposed into a collection of subacts each dened on a naturally
measurable event. No ambiguity is attached to any of these events and each subact
is evaluated by means of a MEU functional. In the second step, all these evaluations
are aggregated linearly by means of q.
We conclude the section by giving a behavioral counterpart to Theorem 1. This
is achieved by introducing an additional axiom, which is, of course, intermediate
between the c-independence axiom of Gilboa-Schmeidler [11] and the full indepen-
dence axiom.
Let  = fig be a nite partition into measurable events of (S;), and let F
be the set of acts which are constant on each i. In other words, F is the set of
all step functions on the partition . We say that a preference relation < on F
satises the axiom of step-independence with respect to the partition  if
Axiom (Step-independence) For any f; g 2 F , a 2 F , and  2 [0; 1]
f  g =) f + (1  )a  g + (1  )a
Proposition 3. Let a preference relation < on F satisfy axioms A1, A3 to A6
in [11] and the axiom of Step-independence with respect to a partition . Then,
(a) < has a MEU representation;
(b) The set of priors C can be decomposed with respect to  as in Theorem 1;
(c)   ANM .
While a full proof is in Appendix, it is nearly immediate to observe that the
axiom of step-independence implies, along with the other axioms, the axiom of c-
independence of Gilboa and Schmeidler. Hence, part (a). Then, one checks that
events in  are naturally measurable (part (c)). Finally, that (c) implies (b) follows
from Theorem 1.
5. ZHANG AND EPSTEIN-ZHANG UNAMBIGUOUS EVENTS
In this section, we study Zhang and Epstein-Zhang unambiguous events. We re-
strict attention to acts of the form fTw (and fT cw) since both Zhang and Epstein-
Zhang consider only acts having this form. Throughout the section, T is a xed
event and we use the notation f(w) in the place of fTw. The rationale for this
notational change will be clear in subsection 5.2, below. Finally, we restrict to
events T such that 0 < minP (T )  maxP (T ) < 1 because if T is such that either
minP (T ) = 0 and maxP (T ) 6= 0 or minP (T ) 6= 1 and maxP (T ) = 1, then T is
necessarily EZ-ambiguous (see Appendix, Proposition 8).
5The quotient is endowed with the nest measurable structure which makes the canonical
projection measurable.
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5.1. From naturally measurable events to Zhang unambiguous events
In light of the inclusion ANM  AZ (Proposition 2), we are concerned with
nding and characterizing those Zhang unambiguous events (if any) which are not
naturally measurable. Our analysis takes o¤ from the following considerations.
Consider the two subsets of priors
CMIN = fP 2 C j P (T ) = ming and CMAX = fP 2 C j P (T ) = maxg
Clearly, both CMAX and CMIN are non-empty, convex and weak*-compact. More-
over, it is immediate to verify that either CMAX \CMIN = ; or CMAX = CMIN = C.












The main reason for introducing ~I and

I is that (as the reader can easily check)
the ranking they induce on acts of the form f(w) is independent of w. That is,








I (g(w0)) 8w0 2 R
For brevity, we will refer to this property as to w-invariance. The functionals ~I and

I provide us with another way to look at naturally measurable events. For if T is
naturally measurable, then CMAX = CMIN = C and for any act f , we have
I(f) = ~I(f) =

I (f)
Hence, the unambiguous nature of T follows at once from the observed w-invariance
Incidentally, this also shows the inclusion ANM  AZ .
If T is not naturally measurable, the functional I which evaluates the acts
is, in general, di¤erent from both ~I and

I . The next lemma, however, shows
that for any act g there exists a g(w) [g(w)] for which I(g(w)) =

I (g(w))
[I(g(w)) = ~I(g(w))]. Equivalently, such an act is evaluated by a prior in CMIN
[CMAX ].
Lemma 1. For any act of the type g(w),
(a) 9w such that I(g(w)) =

I (g(w)) for any w  w.
(b) 9w such that I(g(w)) = ~I(g(w)) for any w  w.
Lemma 1 is a basic result in our analysis as it immediately leads to uncover
a number of properties associated with Zhang unambiguous events. In fact, by
combining Lemma 1 with the w-invariance of ~I and

I , we obtain at once the
following necessary condition for T 2 AZ .
Proposition 4. A necessary condition for T 2 AZ is that if f(w0) % g(w0) at






While the proof is in the Appendix, the reader might want to defer its reading
until next subsection, where we give a simple geometric explanation of the content
of Proposition 4 (Figure 2).
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5.2. A geometric analysis
The concepts we have seen so far lend themselves to a very simple geometric
description. In fact, due to the restriction to acts of the form f(w), the functionals
I, ~I and

I implicitly dene certain families of real functions of real variable. For f
of the type f(w), dene
If : R! R by If (w) = I(f(w))
Proposition 5. For any f = f(w), If is (a) increasing; (b) concave and (c)
continuous.
In a similar fashion, by using the functionals ~I and

I we dene
~If : R! R by ~If (w) = ~I(f(w))
and

I f : R! R by

I f (w) =

I (f(w))
which are straight lines with slopes 1   Pmax(T ) and 1   Pmin(T ), respectively.
Finally, by using ~If and

I f , we dene
I^f (w) = ~If (w) ^







The latter functions will play a major role in our analysis. Figure 1 below describes














For w  w, If =

I f while for w  w, If = ~If . For w 2 (w; w), If is a concave
function between I^f = ~If ^

I f and the line joining

I f (w
) and ~If (w)
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By means of this type of diagrams, we can now give a simple illustration of the
necessary condition found above. Recall that Proposition 4 states that a necessary






We can concisely reformulate this as
Condition NC If T 2 AZ , then f(w) % g(w) at some w implies






















If Cond NC is not satised, the ~Is and

Is are as in the picture.
Any concave If and Ig intersect at some w leading to T =2 AZ .
5.2.1. Su¢ cient conditions for T 2 AZ
Here, we state and geometrically illustrate some su¢ cient conditions for I the
functional that evaluates the acts to be equal to I^. In such a situation, Condition
NC becomes at once necessary and su¢ cient for T 2 AZ . We stress that, in the
context of a Multiple Prior model, conditions on the form of the functional are
automatically conditions on the set of priors.
Below, we report only those conditions which we use in the rest of the paper, but
additional su¢ cient conditions can be obtained by simple geometrical inspection.6
6For instance, one can easily see the following. Let w be the (unique) point st

I (f( w)) =
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For the sake of a more economical exposition, by a su¢ cient condition for T 2 AZ
we mean only that T satises the rst part of Zhangs denition. This is harmless.
Since Zhangs denition consists of two separate parts, one gets a complete su¢ -
cient condition by simply requiring that the same condition be satised when one
exchanges T with its complement T c.
The rst proposition below relies on the (obvious) fact that if C = co fCMIN ; CMAXg,
then I = I^.
Proposition 6. If C = co fCMIN ; CMAXg and Condition NC is satised, then
T 2 AZ .
Next, we explicitly state a simple corollary to Proposition 6. We do so, because
in Section 7 we will use Corollary 1 to give a geometric illustration to our comments
on the notions of ambiguity we have been studying.
Corollary 1. If C is generated by (at most) two priors, P1 and P2 (both
nonatomic), then T 2 AZ i¤ P1 and P2 have the same conditionals both on T
and on T c.
The next proposition exhibits a set of priors which is bigger than co fCMIN ; CMAXg
but still guarantees that I = I^. Again, combined with Condition NC, this implies
at once T 2 AZ . Let
 = min
C
P (T ) ;  = max
C
P (T )
For P an arbitrary set of priors, denote by
P jT = fP ( j T ) j P 2 Pg
where P ( j T ) = P (\T )P (T ) . That is, P jT is the set of conditional probabilities
computed from probabilities in P. Dene
C1 = [fCMIN ; CMAXg] jT ; C2 = [fCMIN ; CMAXg] jT c
and
C = [; ]C1 + [1  ; 1  ]C2 = f1 + (1  )2 j     , 1 2 C1; 2 2 C2g
Proposition 7. If Condition NC is satised and C = C, then T 2 AZ .
~I(f( w)). The following are equivalent
(i)

I (f( w)) = ~I(f( w)) = I(f( w));













The conditions in Prop 6 and Prop 7 both imply If = I^f for any f of the form f(w).
Hence, Cond NC is also su¢ cient.
5.3. Necessary and su¢ cient conditions
We are now ready to give a complete characterization of Zhang unambiguous
events.
Theorem 2. T 2 AZ if and only if the following conditions are satised:
(i) Condition NC: 8f; g of the form f = fTw and g = gTw, either I^f (w) 
I^g(w) or I^f (w)  I^g(w) for any w 2 R;
(ii) The functional I restricted to functions of the form fTw is equal to I^.
Su¢ ciency of the two conditions is immediate from what we said before. Ne-
cessity of (i) was shown above. Only the proof of necessity of (ii) requires a certain
amount of work. Summarily, here is how it goes. Suppose that
CMIN jT \CMAX jT= ? (3)
and consider the act 0Tw (that is, the act that is identically equal to 0 on T and
identically equal to w on T c). A separation theorem due to [4] implies that there
exist two disjoint subsets, A and B, of T , such that P (A) P (B) > 0 > Q(A) Q(B)
for any P 2 CMIN and any Q 2 CMAX . This suggests that, for " > 0, we consider
the act "rTw, where r is the function r = [A   B ], and A and B are the
indicator functions of A and B, respectively. The continuity properties of the MEU
functional imply (see Lemma 5 in Appendix) that there exists an " such that
for any measure R 2 P 2 CMIN j R ("[A   B ]Tw)dP = min	, we have that
R(A)   R(B) > 0. Clearly, this implies that when both "[A   B ]Tw and 0Tw
are evaluated by measures in CMIN (this certainly happens because of Lemma 1),
we have "[A B ]Tw  0Tw. Analogously, when when both "[A B ]Tw and
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0Tw are evaluated by measures in CMAX , we have "[A B ]Tw  0Tw. But this
means that T is Zhang ambiguous. In other words, if T 2 AZ then the intersection





















and prove the following characterization of Condition NC.
Lemma 2. Condition NC is equivalent to the condition that for any act f

(f jT ) \ (~f jT ) 6= ;
Next, we show (Lemma 6) that if for some f we have If (w) < I^f (w), then it
must be the case that either f jT \

f jT= ? or f jT \~f jT= ?. Then, in both
cases, we can follow a procedure similar to the one outlined above to establish that
T has to be Zhang ambiguous. That is if T 2 AZ , then for any f , we must have
If (w) = I^f (w).
5.4. Epstein-Zhang unambiguous events
As general matter (Section 3), Epstein-Zhangs denition is more permissive
than Zhangs. In fact, conditions guaranteeing that the two are non-equivalent can
be derived from Epstein-Zhangs paper, in particular Corollary 7.3. In principle,
this might be the case in our setting as well. That is, an event T might be EZ-
unambiguous without being Z-unambiguous. In such a case, however, at least one
of the conditions in Theorem 2 must be violated, and (either case) there exist (a)
acts fTw and fTw0; (b) priors P and P 0 with I(fTw) =
R
fTwdP and I(fTw0) =R
fTw0dP 0; and (c) events A and B, in T such that P (A)   P (B) > 0 > P 0(A)  
P 0(B). Notice that this means that the conditional relative likelihood of A versus
B varies with the act which is evaluated. While this is certainly an undesirable
feature, we cannot conclude at once that T must necessarily be EZ-ambiguous.
The next theorem shows that this intuition is correct, nonetheless.
Theorem 3. AZ = AEZ .
Details are in Appendix, but the intuition is simple. Given an f(w) with prop-
erties (a), (b) and (c) above, we can construct two acts
g"(w) = f(w) + "[B   A] ; " > 0
h"(w) = f(w) + "[A   B ]
and guarantee that there exist two values, w0 and w00, such that
I(h"(w
0)) > I(f(w0)) > I(g"(w0)) and I(h"(w00)) < I(f(w00)) < I(g"(w00))
Notice that if f(w) is constant on T , we are done because g"(w) and h"(w) are




The results of the previous sections can be given an elegant formulation with
the theorem below. In addition, the theorem provides a representation of the MEU
functional restricted to acts of the form fTw and fT cw for T an unambiguous
event. Later, we use this representation to address two open questions concerning
unambiguous events either in the sense of Zhang or Epstein-Zhang.
Let .
Theorem 4. T 2 AEZ i¤ there exists a set of priors C of the form
C = [; ]1+[1 ; 1 ]2 = f1+(1 )2 j     , 1 2 1; 2 2 2g
where 1 and 2 are weak*-closed, convex sets of priors supported by T and T c,








for all acts of type fTw and for all acts of type fT cw. Moreover, AZ = AEZ .
Finally, T is naturally measurable i¤  = .
Next, we study the axiom of small unambiguous event continuity (see [8],
axiom 4). Roughly, the axiom states that any unambiguous event contains unam-
biguous events of arbitrarily small probability. The axiom is important in the work
of Zhang, Epstein-Zhang and Kopylov [15] in that it allows to derive a convex-
ranged probability on the class of unambiguous events. Recently, Nehring [20] has
questioned the desiderability of the assumption.
Our result is that, in the context of MEU, there exists a fundamental incompat-
ibility between the denitions of unambiguous events given by Zhang and Epstein-
Zhang and the axiom of small unambiguous event continuity. Of course, the
statement needs an obvious qualication. For naturally measurable events are both
Z-unambiguous and EZ-unambiguous and, as we saw in Section 4, naturally mea-
surable events can always be decomposed into smaller naturally measurable events.
In other words, the incompatibility refers to EZ-unambiguous events which are not
naturally measurable. Precisely, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 5. Let T 2 AEZnANM . Then, T contains no unambiguous events.
The proof is constructive and, as such, displays a certain amount of detail.
The strategy of proof is simple, nonetheless. By Theorem 4, an event T is EZ-
unambiguous if and only if the set of priors can be decomposed in the way described
above. Now, suppose that both T and A  T are EZ-unambiguous. Then, we
have two decompositions of the set of priors: one relative to T and one relative
to A. Of course, these two decompositions cannot be unrelated. For instance, an
act of the type fAw can be viewed both as an act which is constant outside A
and as an act which is constant outside T . Clearly, these two views must lead to
the same evaluation because the act is the same. This simple observation allows
us to conclude that the two di¤erent decompositions must satisfy a number of
restrictions. Finally, we use these to produce two acts, fTk and gTk, whose ranking
is not invariant with respect to changes in the constant k, thus contradicting the
assumption either T 2 AEZ or A 2 AEZ .
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The second question we address regards the properties of the classes AZ and
AEZ . These classes were originally believed to be -systems, but Kopylov [15]
observed that, generally speaking, this is not the case. In [15], Kopylov provides an
axiomatization guaranteeing that these classes are mosaics (a weaker property, see
[15]), and, more recently [16], gave an example of a preference relation for which
AZ and AEZ are not -systems. A rather immediate implication of Theorem 5 is
that this cannot be the case in the setting we have been studying. In other words,
we have
Corollary 2. AEZ (hence, AZ) is a -system.
The reason is clear. By Theorem 5, any two events A and B in AEZnANM
cannot be disjoint unless one is the complement of the other. Hence, the property
of AEZ to be a -system follows at once from the property of ANM . We remark
that Corollary 2 does not say that AEZ = ANM . In fact, it is easy to give examples
where AEZ strictly contains ANM (see next section).
7. COMMENTS
Theorem 4 makes it clear that there are unquestionable similarities across the
various denitions of unambiguous events we have been examining. As a matter of
fact, Theorem 4 shows that all the denitions convey the idea that if T is unam-
biguous in a MEU model, then the model itself can be thought of as consisting of
two separate, but unambiguously dened, models: one which is dened on T and
the other which is dened on T c. The only di¤erence is that these two models are
aggregated linearlyif T is naturally measurable, while this is not the case if T is
Z/EZ-unambiguous. Clearly, scholars favoring the notion of naturally measurable
events might argue that Zhangs and Epstein-Zhangs denitions are too weak
[20] exactly because of this reason. To us, this di¤erence does not seem substantial.
Let us elaborate on the point. For the sake of illustration, let us begin with a
decision maker who conforms to the Subjective Expected Utility (SEU) criterion.
Probably, every scholar would agree that any (measurable) subset T of S should be
termed as unambiguous. Each subset is associated to a number of properties: the
decision maker is a SEU maximizer on T, he is probabilistically sophisticated
on T, he is linear with respect to acts that are constant outside T, etc.. Now,
suppose that we want to come up with a denition of unambiguous events. In a
situation of complete (a priori) ignorance, we might adopt the following strategy.
We abstract from the SEU model, and identify the unambiguous nature of an
event with one of the properties displayed by the SEU example. For instance,
one denition would term T unambiguous if the decision maker is probabilistically
sophisticated on T , another if he is linear with respect to acts that are constant
outside T , etc. One of the properties that each and every event T displays in
the SEU example is that knowledge of the conditional probabilities on T and T c
along with knowledge of the minimum probability assigned to T and T c allows us to
recover uniquely the entire model. This is trivial, for if P is the probability which
describes the decision maker, then P can be uniquely written as P () = P (T )P ( j
T ) + P (T c)P ( j T c). In a MEU model, Theorem 4 tells us that the unambiguous
nature of an event according to Zhang or Epstein-Zhang is precisely identied to
this property (because the conditions in Theorem 4 are necessary and su¢ cient). In
this respect, these denitions appear to us as a natural extension of those proposed
by Nehring and Ghirardato, Maccheroni and Marinacci.
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A simple example will clarify the point further. Let S = [0; 1] be endowed with
the usual Borel -algebra, and consider a MEU decision maker who is described by





2 if x 2 [0; 13 )
3
4 if x 2 [ 13 ; 1]











Let T = [0; 1=3). It is easy to see that every non-null naturally measurable
subset intersects both T and its complement. Moreover, T and its complement
are EZ-unambiguous (Corollary 1) and, evidently, not naturally measurable. By
Theorem 5, any subset of T is EZ-ambiguous and it is transparent that it cannot
be naturally measurable.
In the notation of Theorem 4, it is immediate to check that for T = [0; 1=3), 1





, respectively. Moreover (in
the same notation),  = 1=3,  = 1=2 and C = [; ]1 + [1   ; 1   ]2. That
is, knowledge of the conditional models, 1 and 2, and of  and  permits to
reconstruct C uniquely. In contrast, suppose that we take A = [0; 1=4) rather than
T . In this case, the conditional models are dened by the two sets of densities





5 if x 2 [ 14 ; 13 )
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Let 01 and 
0
2 be the corresponding sets of measures. The coe¢ cients  and 
are now 1=4 and 3=8, respectively. It is immediate to see that, with these choices,
C 6= [; ]01 + [1   ; 1   ]02. For instance, for  = 5=16, the density h =











In other words, if A is not Z/EZ-unambiguous, knowledge of the conditional models
is insu¢ cient to uncover the decision makers global behavior.
We can now move to the di¤erences. Transparently, the most striking di¤erence
is the lack of compatibility of Epstein-Zhang notion with the axiom of small unam-
biguous event continuity. An immediate implication of Theorem 5 is that partitions
of S into EZ-unambiguous events that are not naturally measurable contain at most
two elements. In contrast, one can exhibit partitions of S into naturally measurable
events of any nite cardinality (Theorem 1) and even countable or uncountable par-
titions.7 The reason for this is that the additional restriction imposed by Nehring
and Ghirardato, Maccheroni and Marinacci ( =  in Theorem 4) guarantees that
each conditional model is a MEU model of the same type as the unconditional one.8
Somewhat technically, the globalmodel is isomorphic to a product of conditional
models (simply identify disjoint unions of sets with their products). Clearly, this
is not true for Zhang and Epstein-Zhang: since  6= , the value of the bet which
pays 1 on T is not uniquely dened. This creates a link between the factors on T
and T c, thus making them non-independent.
We come now to our nal observations. One of the main themes in the work
of Zhang and Epstein-Zhang is the intuitive link between a notion of unambiguous
events and Savages Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives axiom. This intuition
is transparently formulated in their denitions. Now, suppose that, in loose terms,
one interprets their view as conveying that T should be termed unambiguous if
conditional on T , the decision maker is representable without reference to what
happens outside T . Consider the event A = [0; 1=4) in the example above. There
7Under the assumption that the partition be measurable, one can easily extend Theorem 1 to
the case of uncountable partitions.
8This feature provides an additional motivation for our assumption of non-atomicity. As we
explained in the text, the notion of naturally measurable event delivers that the model, conditional
on each and every naturally measurable event, is a mirror image of the global model. Clearly, the
presence of atoms would break this symmetry. It is also clear, however, that no atom would have
any special signicance in the context of a general theory.
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is no doubt that A satises the criterion. In fact, A satises the rst part of
Epstein-Zhang denition. Yet, A is ambiguous as we saw above and the reason
is that its complement fails the rst part of the denition. A natural question
is, why should we demand that Zhang and Epstein-Zhang classes be closed under
complementation? We do not have a clear answer. Yet, we would like to stress
the legitimacy of our question: closure under complementation is a property which
follows from the denition of naturally measurable events, while it is imposed in the
denitions of Zhang and Epstein-Zhang. On one hand, Theorem 4 and the example
of this section show that, if the classes are not closed under complementation, the
decomposition property of Theorem 4 does not hold. Hence, if one believes that the
unambiguous nature of an event should be identied to the property we described
in the rst paragraph of this section, then there is no choice but to impose closure
under complementation. On the other hand, if ones intuition conforms to the less
demanding interpretation we just gave, one should probably give up the requirement
of closure under complementation.
Finally, let us observe that events like A in the example above have several spe-
cial properties. In particular, A is such that all of its subsets satises the rst part
of Zhang denition (the decision maker is SEU conditional on A). While events
like these have been completely neglected in the current literature, it seems indis-
putable to us that they deserve a place in a debate centered around the notion of
ambiguity. Usually the idea of ambiguity is associated to that of coarse informa-
tion. In contrast, SEU or probabilistic sophistication are associated to the idea of
precise or ne information. It seems then natural to consider situations character-
ized by coarse information in some parts of the state space and by ne information
in some other parts. To this end, depending on whether one leans toward SEU or
probabilistic sophistication as a choice for a benchmark, one should identify those
events A with the property that each and every event B in A satises the rst
part of Zhang (SEU) or Epstein-Zhang (probabilistic sophication) denition. Due
to their properties, objects of this sort should be called Z-lters and EZ-lters,
respectively. A little elaboration on the example we gave above would show that
one can easily exhibit a decision maker who displays the following property: for
almost every point in [0; 1], there is a neighborhood of the point conditional on
which the decision maker is SEU (probabilistically sophisticated), yet his global
model is MEU with an innite-dimensional set of priors. Such a decision maker
is associated to a countable family of Z-lters (EZ-lters) none of which is either
naturally measurable or Z/EZ-unambiguous.
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APPENDIX
A.4 NATURALLY MEASURABLE EVENTS
A.4(a) Proof of Theorem 1
Let E be an event. For f 2 F denote by fE = f jE the restriction of f to E,
and let F jE be set of all such restrictions. When E is endowed with the restriction
of  to E, each element in F jE is measurable.
Given E, dene a preference relation <E on F jE by "fE <E gE i¤ fEw < gEw
for some w 2 R". The following lemma shows that if E is naturally measurable,
then <E is well-dened.
Lemma 3. Let f; g 2 F , w 2 R and let E 2 ANM : If fEw < gEw for some
w 2 R, then for any w0 2 R, we have fEw0 < gEw0.














































that is fEw0 < gEw0.
We can now prove Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem 1. Let  = figi=1;:::;n be a nite partition of S with the
property that each event in the partition is naturally measurable, i.e. i 2 ANM
for each i. We are going to show that for any f 2 F and any g 2 F, we have
I(f + g) = I(f) + I(g) (4)



































giP (i) (because each i 2 ANM )
= I(f) + I(g)
Now, for each i, dene the preference <i by
fi <i gi iff fiw < giw for some w 2 R
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By the previous lemma, <i is well-dened. It is easy to see that <i satises all
the axioms of Gilboa-Schmeidler [11] (because < does). Hence, <i has a MEU
representation. That is, there exists a unique collection of non-empty, weak? com-








Now, dene z : F !Rjj (jj is the cardinality of ) by f 7 ! (Ii(f))i2,
and dene v : Rjj ! R as the unique mapping which makes the diagram below
commute
F z ! Rjj
I & # v
R
That is, v((Ii(f))i2) = I(f).
To complete the proof, it su¢ ces to show that v(:) is a positive linear functional
on Rjj.
(a) v(:) is homogeneous: Let (wi)i=1;:::;n 2 (Ii(F))i2 and  2 R. Dene an
act
f(s) = wi for s 2 i
then


















wiP (i) = v((wi)i=1;:::;n)
(b) v(:) is additive: For any (wi)i=1;:::;n; (w0i)i=1;:::;n 2 (Ii(F))i2; dene a
pair of acts f and g as




i)i=1;:::;n) = v((Ii(f) + Ii(g))i=1;:::;n)
= v((Ii(f + g))i=1;:::;n)
= I(f + g)
= I(f) + I(g) by (4)
= v((wi)i=1;:::;n) + v((w
0
i)i=1;:::;n)
(c) v(:) is positive: Trivially because I(:) is a positive function.
Finally, since v(:) is a positive linear functional there is a positive measure q on
S= (the quotient of S by the partition ) such that















(q is a probability measure because I(1) = 1).
A.4 (b) Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. Since a constant act w 2 R is a step fuction with respect to , step-
independence (along with the Archimedean axiom in [11]) implies constant inde-
pendence in [11], which proves part (a). Let  2 , and for any w;w0 2 R dene
an act a that is a step function on  as
a(s) =

w if s 2 
w0 if s =2 
then, by step independence, for any  2 [0; 1],and f; g 2 F such that f  g; we
have f + (1   )a  g + (1   )a: By Proposition 1,  2 ANM and part (c) is
proven. Finally, part (b) follows from Theorem 1.
A.5 ZHANG AND EPSTEIN-ZHANG UNAMBIGUOUS EVENTS
Proposition 8. Let T be such that either min
C
P (T ) = 0 or max
C
P (T ) = 1, then
T is EZ-ambiguous.
Proof. Let T be such that 0 = minP (T ) < maxP (T )  1. Let C1 = fP 2 C j P (T ) = maxg.
Since C1 is thin, there exists (by an easy application of Lyapunovs convexity The-
orem) an event A  T such that P (A) = 2=3P (T ) for any P 2 C1.Consider the
acts a(w) = (A   Ac)Tw and a(w) = (Ac   A)Tw. It is immediate to see that
there exists n 2 N such that for w   n both acts are evaluated by Ps such that
P (T ) = 0. Hence, I(a(w)) = w = I(a(w)), that is a(w) % a(w). Similarly, for
w0  n, both acts are evaluated by Ps in C1, and we have I(a(w0)) > I(a(w0)).
The same argument with T c in the place of T completes the proof.
A.5.1 From naturally measurable events to Zhang unambiguous events
A.5.1.(a) Proof of Lemma 1







Clearly, for any w,
















9P 2 CMIN implies P (T c) = max. Above, this is denoted by PMAX . Of course, such a P
need not be unique, but the reasoning in the proof uses its value on T c only, which is independent
of the choice we make.
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c)  PMAX(T c)] (5)
Then, for any w there must exist a Zw such that
(i) Zw(T c) < PMAX(T c) (otherwise, we are done);
(ii) inequality (5) is true.
Consider the sequence fwn =  ng and the associated sequence fZwn(T c)g.10
The sequence of real numbers fZwn(T c)g  [PMIN (T c); PMAX(T c)]. Hence,





such that Zwnk (T
c)! x 2 [PMIN (T c); PMAX(T c)].
We have only two possibilities:
(a) if x 6= PMAX(T c), then 9" > 0 such that x + " < PMAX(T c) and 9n such
that 8n  n
Zwnk (T
c) < x+ "
which implies
Zwnk (T
c)  PMAX(T c) < x+ "  PMAX(T c) =   < 0
Hence,
wnk [Zwnk (T
c)  PMAX(T c)] =  nk[Zwnk (T c)  PMAX(T c)] > nk
that is the expression on the RHS of (5) is unbounded. Hence, inequality (5) must
be violated because the LHS is bounded. It follows that the only possibility is
(b) Zwnk (T
c)! PMAX(T c):
Since g is a simple function on T , g can be written as g =
mP
i=1
iAi , fAigm1 a




















i[P (Ai)  Zwnk (Ai)]
Dene






i[P (Ai)  Zwnk (Ai)] 
mX
i[P (Ai)  Zwnk (Ai)]
Let  = sup
i




[P (Ai)  Zwnk (Ai)] >  nk[Zwnk (T c)  PMAX(T c)]
















g(w)dP + wPMAX(T c) 
Z
T
g(w)dZ + wZ(T c)
for any Z =2 CMIN .
Now, we want to show that it is so for any w  w.11 Let " > 0, and suppose
by the way of contradiction that there exist a measure Zw " =2 CMIN such that










The integral on T is not a¤ected by changes in w (by the w-invariance of

I ). Hence,





g(w)dP + (w   ")PMAX(T c) >
Z
T









g(w)dZw "+wZw "(T c)+"[PMAX(T c) Zw "(T c)]




Part (b) is proven in a similar way.
A.5.1.(b) Proof of Proposition 4
We are going to show that if T 2 AZ , then f(w) % g(w) at some w implies





(b) 9w such that ~I(f(w))  ~I(g(w)).









Since 8w, I(f(w)) 

I (f(w)), we have I(f(w)) <





11This does not follow immediately. We have only shown that the strict inequality (5) has to
be violated an innite number of times along the subsequence we used.
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By the previous lemma, 9 w such that I(g( w)) =

I (g( w)), and at such w we would
have
I(f( w)) < I(g( w))
contradicting T 2 AZ . Similarly for part (b).
A.5.2 A geometric analysis
A.5.2(a) Proof of Proposition 5





fdP + wP (T c)]
(a) w1  w0 implies that 8PZ
T




fdP + w0P (T
c)
Hence, I(f(w1))  I(f(w0)).
(b) For any  2 [0; 1]
If (w1) + (1  )If (w0) = minC [
Z
T
fdP + w1P (T












fdP + (w1 + (1  )w0)P (T c)] = If (w1 + (1  )w0)
(c) Let fwng  R be such that wn ! w. Then, f(wn)! f(w) in the supnorm
topology. Continuity of I implies I(f(wn))! I(f(w)). Hence, If (wn)! If (w).
A.5.2(b) Proof of Proposition 6




fdZ1 + (1  
)
R
fdZ0, some  2 [0; 1] and Z1 2 CMIN , Z0 2 CMAX . Hence,Z
fdQ = 
Z














That is, for any f , I(f) = I^(f). By Condition NC, f(w0) % g(w0) at w0 implies
I(f(w)) = I^(f(w))  I^(g(w)) = I(g(w)) for any w. That is, T 2 AZ :
A.5.2(c) Proof of Corollary 1
Proof. Under the hypothesis in the statement, the condition C = co fCMIN ; CMAXg
is automatically satised. In this case, Condition NC means that P1 and P2 order
mappings of the type f(w) in exactly the same way. Under nonatomicity, this is
equivalent to saying that they have the same conditionals both on T and T c (see
[3]).
A.5.2(d) Proof of Proposition 7
This is a corollary to Theorem 4, which we prove later. We refer the reader to
that proof.
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A.5.3 Necessary and su¢ cient conditions
A.5.3(a) Proof of Lemma 2
We begin by establishing a simple fact. Recall that for C a set of priors, the nota-
tion C jT stands for the set of conditional probabilities computed from probabilities
in C.
Lemma 4. If CMIN jT= CMAX jT , then Condition NC in the main text is
satised.
Proof. Let f; g be of type f(w) and g(w), respectively. Observe that, if CMIN jT=






































gdP ( j T )













I^f (w)  I^g(w) for any w 2 R
because of the w-invariance of the functionals

I and ~I.
Now, if T 2 AZ and f(w) % g(w) for some w, then f(w0) % g(w0) for any




I (g(w)). Hence, the conclusion
follows from the w-invariance of

I and the previous observation.
However, it is evident that, in general, the condition in the previous lemma is















Both sets are nonempty (because CMIN and CMAX are closed (hence, weak*-
compact) in the weak*-compact set C). In general, neither set is a singleton. Note,
however, that if P and Q are in, say,













fdP + wP (T c) =
R
T
fdQ+ wQ(T c) and P;Q 2

f ]




fdP is independent of the choice of the minimizer.
Similarly, for ~I in the place of

I .
Lemma 2 Condition NC is equivalent to the condition that for any act f

(f jT ) \ (~f jT ) 6= ;
Proof of Su¢ ciency. The proof is essentially the same as the proof of the














P (T )) is independent of the choice of the minimizer, allows us to select any
measure in

f to express such a value. Hence, the proof is completed by selecting
exactly those measures in

 and ~ whose conditionals on T coincide.
In order to prove the necessity of the condition, we need two additional results.
The rst is a separation theorem proven in [4] (In [4], this is stated as Corollary 5).
Let C1 and C2 be weak*-compact subsets of ba1(), and assume that both C1
and C2 consist of countably additive measures. Further, assume that every measure
is nonatomic and that C1 [ C2 is thin. All these assumptions are satised in our
setting. We have
Theorem 6 (Amarante and Maccheroni [4]). C1\C2 = ? i¤ there exist A;B 2
, A\B = ;, such that P (A) P (B) > 0 > Q(A) Q(B) for any P 2 C1 and any
Q 2 C2.
The second result is stated in the following lemma.
Lemma 5. For any f 2 B(); the correspondence f 7 !

f (f 7 ! ~f ) is
upper hemi-continuous.
Proof. This is an immediate consequence of Berges maximum theorem (see
Aliprantis and Border [1]).
Proof of Necessity. We are going to show that if the condition fails, then so
does Condition NC.
Assume that there exists an f for which

(f jT ) \ (~f jT ) = ;









f  CMIN and a ~Pf 2 ~f  CMAX . Then,

P f ( j T ) 6= ~Pf ( j T )
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Because of the assumption, this property does not depend on the choice we made.
By Theorem 6, there exist two disjoint sets A;B  T (A;B 2 ) such that

P f (A j T ) >

P f (B j T ) and ~Pf (A j T ) < ~Pf (B j T ) (7)
=)

P f (A) >

P f (B) and ~Pf (A) < ~Pf (B)
for all

P f 2 CMIN and all ~Pf 2 CMAX .
The collection H = fHig is a partition of T . Consider the partition of T given
by
Z = fA;B; Tn(A [B)g
Further consider the partition of T given by
H ^Z




i i + wT c
Moreover (by construction), there exist two disjoint subsets K;J  f1; :::;mg such
that X
K








(i + ") i +
X
J
(i   ") i +
X
i=2K[J
i i + wT c
Notice that for every measure QZ
h"dQ 
Z
fdQ = "[Q(A) Q(B)] (8)













P f (B)] (9)
and
~Ih"(w)  ~If (w)  "[ ~Pf (A)  ~Pf (B)] (10)



















































Proof of CLAIM 2: By the way of contradiction, suppose that there is no


















For a sequence f"ng  R++ such that "n ! 0, h"n converges (sup-norm) to

















f . Clearly, such convergent sequences exist. But, the limit measure P has
the property that P (A)  P (B)  0 and cannot be

f because of (7).















such that f and h" are all evaluated by
the

I functionals, that is Iz(w) =

I z(w







such that f and h" are all evaluated by the ~I functionals.
Therefore
I^h" (w
) > I^f (w)
and
I^h" (w
) < I^f (w)
That is, if the condition in the statement fails, then there exists a pair of func-
tions (f; h") such that Condition NC fails.
A.5.3(b) Proof of Theorem 2
Before proving Theorem 2, we need one more lemma. By virtue of the previous




f and a ~Pf 2 ~f whose conditionals on
T coincide.
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Lemma 6. Assume that Condition NC holds. If there exist an f and a w such
that If (w) < I^f (w), then
either f jT \

f jT= ? or f jT \~f jT= ?
Proof. Suppose not, that is both sets are nonempty. Hence, there exist Q1 and
Q2 in f such that
Q1( j T ) = ~R( j T ) for some ~R 2 ~f (11)
Q2( j T ) =























f(w)d ~R+ w ~R(T c)

















f(w)dQ1( j T )  ~R(T )
Z
T
f(w)d ~R( j T ) < w[Q1(T )  ~R(T )]








R( j T ) < w[Q2(T ) 

R(T )]
[Q1(T )  ~R(T )]
Z
T
f(w)d ~R( j T ) < w[Q1(T )  ~R(T )]
Now, let

P f and ~Pf be two measures in

f and ~f whose conditionals on T coincide.
Such measures exist (by Lemma 2) because we assumed that Condition NC holds.









P f ( j T )Z
T
f(w)d ~R( j T ) =
Z
T





P f [ ~R and ~Pf ] are in

f [~f ]. Moreover,

P f ( j T ) = ~Pf ( j T ).
Hence, the previous inequalities can be rewritten as
[Q2(T ) 






P f ( j T ) < w[Q2(T ) 

P f (T )] (12)





P f ( j T ) < w[Q1(T )  ~Pf (T )]
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Since neither Q1 nor Q2 are in

f [ ~f (because this would contradict If (w) <
I^f (w)), we have [Q2(T ) 










P f ( j T ) > w
a contradiction.
We are now ready to prove Theorem 2.
Proof of Theorem 2. Su¢ ciency is immediate. Necessity of (i) was shown in
the rst part. We have only to show the necessity of (ii). To this end, assume that
(i) holds and suppose, by the way of contradiction, that there exists an f(w) = fTw
such that If (w) < I^f (w). By the previous lemma, it must be case that
either f jT \

f jT= ? or f jT \~f jT= ?
Without loss, assume that the rst set is empty. By Theorem 6 (stated in the proof





f and any Pf 2 f , we have

P f (A j T ) >

P f (B j T ) and Pf (A j T ) < Pf (B j T ) (13)
=)

P f (A) >

P f (B) and Pf (A) < Pf (B)
Now, we can proceed by dening a new function h", " > 0, exactly as in the proof
of Lemma 2. Immediately, we have that for any w0 2 R,
Ih"(w
0)  If (w0)  "[Pf (A)  Pf (B)] (14)
The proof of this statement is exactly the same as the proof of CLAIM 1 in the













"). By CLAIM 2 in the proof of Lemma 2,
we can nd an " (and an associated w") such that
Ih" (w

") > If (w

")
At w, by assumption If (w) < I^f (w). It then follows from (13) and (14), that
If (w) > Ih"(w)
for all " > 0. That is, the expression [If (w0)  Ih(w0)] changes sign as w varies, and
this contradict T 2 AZ .
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A.5.4 Epstein-Zhang unambiguous events
Let f be such that

(f jT ) \ (~f jT ) = ;
From Theorem 6, we know that there exist two disjoint sets A;B  T (A;B 2 )
such that

P f (A j T ) >

P f (B j T ) and ~Pf (A j T ) < ~Pf (B j T )
=)

P f (A) >

P f (B) and ~Pf (A) < ~Pf (B)
for all

P f 2 CMIN and a ~Pf 2 CMAX . Dene r = A   B and r = B   A, and,
for " > 0, consider the two functions
h"(w) = f(w) + "r(0)
g"(w) = f(w) + "r(0)
Lemma 7. If there exists an f for which

(f jT ) \ (~f jT ) = ;
then, there exist " > 0 and two points, w and w0 such that
I^(h"(w)) > I^(f(w)) > I^(g"(w))
and
I^(h"(w
0)) < I^(f(w0)) < I^(g"(w0))





was already shown in Lemma 2. Moreover, the last inequality holds for any " > 0
(see proof of Lemma 2). By a similar argument, one shows that there exists an
" > 0 such that (see proof of Lemma 2)
I^(h"(w)) > I^(f(w)) > I^(g"(w))
and
I^(h"(w
0)) < I^(f(w0)) < I^(g"(w0))
With the inequality I^(f(w)) > I^(g"(w)) holding for any " > 0. To complete the
proof, we only need to show that we can choose the same " for both h and g. To
this end, it su¢ ces to show that
I^(h"(w)) > I^(f(w)) =) I^(h"(w)) > I^(f(w)) for any 0 < " < "
I^(g"(w
0)) > I^(f(w0)) =) I^(g"(w0)) > I^(f(w0)) for any 0 < " < "
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This follows straight from the concavity of I^. In fact, noticing that for any 0 < " <
",
h"(w) = h"(w) + (1  )f(w) some  2 (0; 1)
we have
I^(h"(w))  I^(h"(w)) + (1  )I^(f(w)) > I^(f(w))
and similarly for I^(g"(w0)).
Proof of Theorem 3. The inclusion AZ  AEZ comes straight out of the
denitions. We are going to show that T =2 AZ =) T =2 AEZ thus showing that
AZ  AEZ . First, suppose that condition (i) in Theorem 2 is violated. Then, there
exist g" and h" like in the previous lemma so that (recall that, from Lemma 1, the
points w and w0 can be chosen so that I^ in the inequalities in Lemma 7 can be
taken equal to I)
I(h"(w)) > I(f(w)) > I(g"(w))
I(h"(w
0)) < I(f(w0)) < I(g"(w0))










)dP 2 CMIN for all n n¯ (because
eventually 1nf is in a neighborhood of the function that is identically 0 on T ).



















































For n  max fn; n
¯









f(w0)) < I(g";n(w0)) ;8w0  w (17)
Notice that for w w
¯
, I in (16a) is equal to

I . Similarly, for w0  w, I in (17) is
equal to ~I (see proof of Lemma 2). Taking the limits for n!1 of both (16a) and
(17) and using the (sup-norm) continuity of I, we have
I("r(w))  w





I("r(w))  w ~P (T c)  I("r(w)) ;8w0  w (19)













(B   A)dP + w

P (T c) < w

P (T c)








contains at least a
measure P (in fact, all) such that P (B)   P (A) < 0. Since "r(w) and "r(w) are
EZ-conjugate, this shows that T is EZ-ambiguous.
Finally, a proof that T is EZ-ambiguous if condition (i) in Theorem 2 is satised
but condition (ii) is violated is obtained exactly along the same lines by taking into
account Lemma 6 (see proof of Theorem 2).
A.6 APPLICATIONS
A.6 (a) Proof of Theorem 4
Proof. We prove the statement only for acts of the form fTw. The proof for
acts of the form fT cw follows at once by exchanging T and T c.
(Necessity) Fix an MEU model with set of priors C. Since T 2 AZ , we have






I (f(w)) and ~I(f(w)) can be written as




fdP ( j T ) + w(1  )





fdP ( j T ) + w(1  )
Dene
1 = co fCMAX jT [CMIN jT g
2 = co fCMAX jT c [CMIN jT cg
and
C = [; ]1  [1  ; 1  ]2














fdP ( j T ) + w(1  )










We are going to show that equality holds.
By denition of 1, any minimizer of
R
T
fdP ( j T ) is either in CMAX jT or in
CMIN jT , Hence, let P 2 CMAX jT [CMIN jT be such thatZ
T




Suppose that P 2 CMAX jT . By denition, there exists a
_
P 2 CMAX whose
conditional on T coincides with P .
CLAIM: if Q 2 ~f , then
R
T
fdQ( j T )  R
T
fd P .
In fact, Q 2 ~f implies that for any measure in CMAX , hence for
_






















fdQ( j T )  R
T
fd P .








Since T 2 AZ , Condition NC holds and by Lemma 2

(f jT ) \ (~f jT ) 6= ;
That is, there exists a

Pf ( j T ) 2








Pf ( j T )
By denition,


























Similarly, we reach the same conclusion if we start by assuming that P 2 CMIN jT .










A.6(b) Proof of Theorem 5
We divide the proof into several claims. To begin, let T 2 AZnANM and let
A  T . Dene
CTMAX = fP 2 CjP 2 argmax
P2C
P (T )g
CTMIN = fP 2 CjP 2 argmin
P2C
P (T )g
CAMAX = fP 2 CjP 2 argmax
P2C
P (A)g
CAMIN = fP 2 CjP 2 argmin
P2C
P (A)g
Let  = minP (T ),  = maxP (T ),  = minP (A), and  = maxP (A). Assume
 6=  and  6= .
CLAIM 1 CTMAX \ CAMAX 6= ?, and CTMIN \ CAMIN 6= ?.
Proof. Let f(w) = 0Aw. Observe that f(w) is an act which is constan both on
Ac and on T c. Therefore, by Theorems 4 and 2
I(f(w)) = bIT (f(w)) = bIA(f(w));





















(wP (TnAjT )  w)) + w; ( min
P2CTMAX




(f jT )\(~f jT ) 6= ; (Lemma 2), min
P2CTMIN
(wP (TnAjT ) w)) = min
P2CTMAX
(wP (TnAjT ) 
w)). Since w > 0, we have
bIT (f(w) = ( min
P2CTMAX
(wP (TnAjT )  w)) + w




fw(1  ); w(1  )g
= w(1  )
Hence,
(wP (TnAjT )  w)) + w = w(1  )
which implies
P (TnAjT ) =    

From which we conclude (since P  2 CTMAX) that
P (TnA) =     =) P (A) =  =) P  2 CAMAX =) CAMAX \ CTMAX 6= ?
Similarly, one shows that CTMIN \ CAMIN 6= ? by taking w < 0.
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Before tackling the proof of Theorem 5, we need one more observation. Let
f 2 F be a three step act:
f =
8<: k if s 2 Ak0 if s 2 TnA
k00 if s 2 T c
Such an act can be thought of in two di¤erent ways. As an act of the form fTk00
and as an act of the form fAck. For T 2 AEZ , from Theorem 4 we have that






kP (AjT ) + k0P (TnAjT )  k00) + k00; ( min
P2CTMAX






(k   k0)P (AjT ) + k0   k00) + k00; ( min
P2CTMAX
(k   k0)P (AjT ) + k0   k00) + k00
)
By choosing k00 small enough, we can guarantee that  and some P 2 CTMIN
attain the minimum. Moreover, for k > k0 we can guarantee that the P in CTMIN is
such that P (A) =  (existence of such a P in CTMIN was shown in CLAIM 1 above).
In the same fashion, by choosing k00 big enough, we can guarantee that the
minimum obtains for  and some P 0 in CTMAX . Moreover, for k > k0 such a P 0
would be such that P 0(A) =  = min
P2CTMAX
P (A) is used. Summarizing, for k > k0
the evaluation of a three step act like ours is eitherbIT (f(k00)) = k + (  )k0 + (1  )k00 (22)
or bIT (f(k00)) = k + (   )k0 + (1  )k00 (23)
By denition of , and , we have     .
We can prove our rst result. The proof is restricted to the case  < . The
case  =  will be dealt with in the proof of Proposition 10, below.
Proposition 9. If T 2 AEZnANM , then there is no A  T such that A 2
AEZnANM .
Proof. We proceed by contradiction. Let f(k00), g(k00); f(k) and g(k) be four
three step acts
f(k00) =
8<: k if s 2 Ak0 if s 2 TnA
k00 if s 2 T c
and g(k00) =
8<: t if s 2 At0 if s 2 TnA
k00 if s 2 T c
f(k) =
8<:
k if s 2 A
k0 if s 2 TnA
k if s 2 T c
and g(k) =
8<:
t if s 2 A
t0 if s 2 TnA
k if s 2 T c
where we choose k > k0 and t > t0.
For k00 small enough we can guarantee that f(k00) and g(k00) are evaluated as in
(22), i.e.
I(f(k00)) = bIT (f(k00)) = k + (  )k0 + (1  )k00
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I(g(k00)) = bIT (g(k00)) = t+ (  )t0 + (1  )k00
while for k big enough we can guarantee that f(k) and g(k) are evaluated as in
(23), i.e.
I(f(k)) = bIT (f(k)) = k + (   )k0 + (1  )k
I(g(k)) = bIT (g(k)) = t+ (   )t0 + (1  )k
Let us rename variables by setting
x = k t; y = k0 t0; a = ; b =  ; c = ; d =  ; (24)
Case 1: ab <
c
d . We have
I(f(k00))  I(g(k00)) = (k   t) + (  )(k0   t0) = ax+ by
and












Bt choosing x and y as in Figure 6, we get I(f(k00))  I(g(k00)) > 0 and I(f(k)) 
I(g(k)) < 0, thus contradicting T 2 AEZ .
Case 2: ab >
c
d . By choosing x and y as in Figure 7, we get I(f(k
00)) I(g(k00)) >












Case 3: ab =
c
d . We distinguish between two subcases.
Case 3.1: b > d. Observe that
b > d ()   >   () 2
   <
2
















choose k > 0 big enough so that   (   )
b  d k +  <  ". Dene
k = "; t =  "; k0 =   (   )
b  d k; t
0 = k0 + ; (25)
By choosing k00 small enough so that both f(k00) and g(k00) are evaluated as in (22),
we have
I(f(k00))  I(g(k00)) = (k   t) + (  )(k0   t0)
= 2"+ (  )( )
Hence, because of our choice of 
I(f(k00))  I(g(k00)) < 0 (27)
On the other hand, by denition of a and c, we have a < c. Hence,
(a  c)" < 0
()
(a  c)k + (b  d)k0 + (   )k < 0 (by (25))
()
k + (  )k0 + (1  )k < k + (   )k0 + (1  )k (by (24))
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That is, I(f(k)) = k + (  )k0 + (1  )k. Next, observe that c > a, b > d and
 > 0 imply
(c  a)( ") + (d  b) < 0
()
(c  a)t+ (d  b)t0 + (  )k < 0 (because (d  b)t0 + (  )k = (d  b) by (25))
()
t+ (   )t0 + (1  )k < t+ (  )t0 + (1  )k (by (24))
That is, I(g(k)) = t+ (   )t0 + (1  )k. Summing up,
I(f(k))  I(g(k)) = k + (  )k0 + (1  )k  t+ (   )t0 + (1  )k
= (+ )"+ (b  d)k0   (   ) + (   )k
= (+ )"  (   )
Hence,
I(f(k))  I(g(k)) > 0 (28)
Now, inequality (27) and inequality (28) contradict the assumption T 2 AEZ .
Case 3.2: b < d
Here, we consider acts which are constant on A, and we will produce a contra-
diction with the hypothesis that A 2 AEZ (() Ac 2 AEZ).
Let f(k) and g(k) be dened by:
f(k) =
8<: k if s 2 Ak0 if s 2 TnA
k00 if s 2 T c
; g(k) =
8<: k if s 2 At0 if s 2 TnA
t00 if s 2 T c
where we choose k > k0 and t > t0, and let f(k) and g(k) be dened by
f(k) =
8<: k if s 2 Ak0 if s 2 TnA
k00 if s 2 T c
; g(k) =
8<: k if s 2 At0 if s 2 TnA
t00 if s 2 T c
where we choose k > k0 and k > t0.
Set
k =  "; t0 =  2"; k0 = t0   "
   ; t
00 = "; k00 = t00 +
"
1  
Choose k big enough so that both f(k) and g(k) are evaluated as in (22), we have
I(f(k))  I(g(k)) = (  )(k0   t0) + (1  )(k00   t00)
= (  )(  "




I(f(k))  I(g(k)) = 0 (29)
Next, observe that c > a, d > b,  >  (see (24); d > b by the assumption) imply
(c  a)( ") + (d  b)( 2"  "
   ) + (  )("+
"
1   ) < 0()
(c  a)k + (d  b)k0 + (  )k00 < 0
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That is
k + (   )k0 + (1  )k00 < k + (  )k0 + (1  )k00 (see (24))
which implies I(f(k)) = k + (   )k0 + (1  )k00.
On the other hand, c > a, d > b and  >  also impy
(c  a)( ") + (d  b)( 2") + (  )" < 0
()
(c  a)k + (d  b)t0 + (  )t00 < 0
()
k + (   )t0 + (1  )t00 < k + (  )t0 + (1  )t00 (see (24))
That is, I(g(k)) = k + (   )t0 + (1  )t00. Combining the last two ndings,
I(f(k))  I(g(k)) = k + (   )k0 + (1  )k00  k + (   )t0 + (1  )t00
= (   )(k0   t0) + (1  )(k00   t00)
= (   )(  "




(  )(1  ) [(   ) (1  )  (1  ) (  )]
=   "








I(f(k))  I(g(k)) < 0 (30)
Now, equality (29) and inequality (30) contradict Ac 2 AEZ . To complete the
proof, the only case left to consider is  = . This can be dealt with by using the
same construction as in the proof of Proposition 10, below.
Proposition 10. If T 2 AEZnANM , then there is no A  T such that A 2
ANM .
Proof. By the way of contradiction, assume that such an A exists. Recall that
A 2 ANM means  =  = . For any three step act,
f(k00) =
8<: k if s 2 Ak0 if s 2 TnA
k00 if s 2 T c
we have
I(f(k00)) = bIT (f(k00))
= min fk + (  )k0 + (1  )k00; k + (   )k0 + (1  )k00g
Hence,
k0 > k00 =) I(f(k00)) = k + (  )k0 + (1  )k00 (31)
k0 < k00 =) I(f(k00)) = k + (   )k0 + (1  )k00 (32)
Now, let f(k00) and g(k00) be dened by
f(k00) =
8<: k if s 2 Ak0 if s 2 TnA
k00 if s 2 T c
; g(k00) =
8<: t if s 2 At0 if s 2 TnA
k00 if s 2 T c
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for some k0 > k00 and t0 > k00; and let f(k) and g(k) be dened by
f(k) =
8<:
k if s 2 A
k0 if s 2 TnA
k if s 2 T c
; g(k) =
8<:
t if s 2 A
t0 if s 2 TnA
k if s 2 T c
for some k > k0 and t0 > k. Notice that all these acts are constant on T c.
Let " > 0, and dene






where  is chosen so that 0 <  < (   )".
For k00 small enough, both f(k00) and g(k00) are evaluated as in (31). Thus,












I(f(k00))  I(g(k00)) > 0 (33)
Next, observe that by construction t0 > k > k0, which implies that f(k) is evaluated

















  [(  )(2") + (1  )"]
=  + (  )"
Hence, by our choice of 
I(f(k))  I(g(k)) < 0 (35)
Now, inequality (33) and inequality (35) contradict T 2 AEZ .
This, along with Proposition 9 completes the proof of Theorem 5.
A.6(c) Proof of Corollary 2
Proof. It is immediate that ? and S are in AEZ . Moreover, by denition, AEZ
is closed under complementation. Now, we need to show that if A, B are in AEZ
and A\B = ?, then A[B 2 AEZ . We are going to show that if A, B are in AEZ
and A\B = ?, A 6= Bc, then both A and B are necessarily naturally measurable.
Then, the property follows from the fact that naturally measurable events make up
a -system.
To begin, suppose that B 2 AEZnANM . Then, Bc 2 AEZ because AEZ is
closed under complementation, and Bc =2 ANM (because otherwise one would con-
tradict B 2 AEZnANM ). That is, Bc 2 AEZnANM . By assumption, A \ B = ?
which implies Bc  A (strictly). By Theorem 5, this contradicts A 2 AEZ . That
is, B 2 ANM . By reversing the role of A and B, one shows A 2 ANM .
Finally, the property that AEZ is closed under countable disjoint unions follows
from the fact that ANM is.
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